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#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

####  ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

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**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction

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(Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistance have much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics, patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central role in support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

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#### Obama is pushing immigration – PC is key – it will pass

- momentum

- GOP needs a win

**McMorris-Santoro 10/15**

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### Plan unpopular with GOP—demographics, wages, and illegal immigration

**Stanely-Becker 13**

(Tom, Government Research Assistant at University of Chicago, Yale Daily News, Peer-reviewed by Peter Swenson, Yale’s C.M. Saden Professor of Political Science. “Strange Bedfellows: Business, Labor, Guest Workers, and Immigration Reform in the United States, 1986-2013” April 19th, pg online at <http://www.library.yale.edu/prizes/applebaum/papers/stanley-becker.pdf//sd>)

Yet as business promotes unrestricted employment of guest workers, a key part of the Republican Party’s base opposes not only the entry of immigrant workers, the undocumented and temporary guests, but the agenda of immigration reform. Particularly in the House, Republicans come from districts with electorates more white and native-born than those in Democratic strongholds: 131 House Republicans represent districts that are more than 80% white in contrast to only 31 Democrats elected in such homogeneous districts. And only 46 House Republicans come from districts that are less white than the national average. Thus, congressional Republicans confront rival pressures, from a business leadership advocating a broad new guest worker program and an electorate hostile to increasing the flow of foreign labor into the country and granting any form of amnesty to undocumented workers. In turn, conservative Republicans leaders have attacked the Chamber’s position on guest workers. Echoing the allegations of Democratic Senator Dorgan in 2007, Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama issued a press release early in 2013 claiming that all Americans “should be concerned about the immigration agenda of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.” According to Sessions, the Chamber is uninterested in a lawful immigration system or securing the borders, but simply wants “to get as much cheap labor as possible.” Challenging the Chamber’s view of the free market, Sessions argued, “Surely the Chamber hasn’t abandoned belief in the power of the market; such a visa program is certain to take jobs from American workers and depress wages.”30 In advocating too robustly for an unrestricted guest worker program and the worldwide reach of the U.S. market in immigrant labor, business risks division from longstanding allies in the Republican Party.

#### Reform key to competitiveness and growth

**Trujillo and Melgoza 13**

Mr. Trujillo is chairman of the Trujillo Group, LLC and co-chairman of the Latino Donor Collaborative. Mr. Melgoza is the CEO of Geoscape International Inc. The Economic—and Demographic—Case for Immigration Reform, 2/21/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323951904578290471589119346.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

Since the November election, there has been much talk in Washington and on the pundit circuit about America's changing demographics, especially the "Latino vote" and the new realities of political campaigning. There has also been considerable wrangling over immigration and what it means for a country that is a nation of immigrants but is more crowded than it once was.¶ The immigration debate is significant to America's politics and culture, but it is also crucial to the country's economics, a subject that receives too little attention. Let's be blunt: The future wealth and well-being of the American people—the country's economic security, national security, business innovation, GDP growth and status in the global marketplace—require a comprehensive solution to the chronic problems caused by a broken immigration policy. In particular, the status of 11 million unauthorized Latino immigrants now living here must be resolved.¶ The economics are simple: Latinos spur demand. Seventy percent of the nation's gross domestic product is fueled by consumer spending. That means the Latino population—large, growing and increasingly prosperous—will play a key role in America's economic future.¶ Latinos are now by far the country's biggest minority-market segment. Including unauthorized residents, the Latino population now exceeds 54 million (not counting nearly four million in Puerto Rico). Blacks, in second place, number 39 million. The Latino population has increased by more than 52% since 2000. In the same period, the non-Latino white population grew less than 2% and blacks by 14%.¶ According to U.S. Census forecasts, the Latino population in America will reach 133 million by 2050. Those 133 million American Latinos will outnumber the populations of Japan and Russia, whose numbers are already in decline.¶ With growing numbers comes more spending: Latino purchasing power now exceeds $1.2 trillion and, according to the University of Georgia's Selig Center, will top $1.5 trillion by 2015. From a global perspective, that means America's Latino market would be the 11th-largest economy in the world—just below France, Italy and Mexico, and above South Korea, Spain and Indonesia. At $20,400 per capita, Latino America's purchasing power already exceeds the GDP per capita of all four BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China.¶ But Latinos' beneficial economic effect is hardly restricted to the demand side. A vital element of supply-side health is labor—workers, from the most talented who invent new products or start a business, to those just beginning to climb the ladder of self-improvement, whether through formal education or on-the-job training.¶ Nearly one in six American workers (16%) is Latino, with nearly 23 million Latinos in the U.S. holding jobs. You might not know it from media coverage of immigration issues, but Latinos have the highest labor-force participation rate (nearly 67%) of any American demographic group.¶ Slightly more than a quarter of children in the U.S. under age 18 are Latino. Based on existing trends, at least 1.1 million Latino youths will turn 18 each year for the next 20 years. Politicians may see 1.1 million new voters a year, but business owners see 1.1 million new workers with a strong work ethic. Given the aging of the country's baby boom generation—retiring at the rate of 10,000 a day for the next 18 years—the strength of the economy is increasingly linked to the promise of these younger workers.¶ Dire demographics threaten the economies in many developed nations, and the U.S. is not immune to the challenges posed by an aging population. But the problem will be considerably mitigated by immigrants who revitalize the workforce. The average later-life American, whose life expectancy nearly doubled during the 20th century, is already asking: Who is going to pay for the Social Security and Medicare promises of the federal government?¶ The answer: America's expanding, youthful immigrant population—another reason why ensuring educational opportunities at every level for all residents is in the national interest.¶ Getting the U.S. economy moving again requires action on many fronts: tax and regulatory reform, new approaches to energy, education and health care. But nothing is more important than immigration reform. Despite the impression left by much of the rhetoric in Washington, immigration reform is not just about politics. It's about jobs, growth and competitiveness—economic security, which in turn means national security.¶ To achieve these benefits, immigration policies and practices must be attuned to welcoming hardworking immigrants and to dealing fairly and smartly with those who are already in the U.S. regardless of their legal status. Legal immigration, including a guest-worker program that will bolster American business productivity, should be expanded in an intelligent way that is pro-investment and pro-growth. U.S. borders need to be secured against further illegal immigration.¶ Washington must send a clear signal—to the American people and to every level of government—that a coherent and enforceable immigration policy is in place and here to stay.

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### 1nc

#### Counterplan text: The United States federal government should reverse status quo funding cuts to counter-terrorism and not retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. The United States Armed Forces should develop and implement a mobile Sea Basing naval capability aimed at ensuring adequate United States forward deployment and power projection capabilities.

#### Obama announced cutbacks in counterterror efforts – such cuts make efficiency in anti-terror efforts more impossible

**Tourangbam 13** [Monish Tourangbam, Eurasia Review, 6/29/13 http://www.eurasiareview.com/29062013-rethinking-us-counter-terrorism-policy-analysis-2/]

Close to 12 years after the 9/11 attacks that led to the global war on terror, and defined the landscape of US foreign policy and national security strategy, President Barack Obama delivered a landmark speech, seeking to reorient US counter-terrorism policy. Speaking at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy that aimed at trimming down the predominance that counter-terrorism had occupied in US policymaking. This has been timed with the continuing drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan, a process that, by the end of 2014, would transfer combat responsibilities to Afghan forces, committing the residual US forces to only a training and advisory role, albeit, stationing some special operations forces to make sure that the Al Qaeda is never again able to attack the US homeland. The speech also made public Obama’s intention to scale down the drone campaign, subject it to tighter scrutiny and oversight, and recommit his second term to finally closing the controversial Guantanamo Bay prison facility. As such, this new realignment in US counter-terrorism policy is an attempt to gauge the evolving nature of threats to the United States, and respond with a proportionate use of force. Obama acknowledged continuing threats from terrorists, both external and home-grown, but he did not consider them an existential threat, thus accounting for the reassessment necessary in how the US responded to them. He used the occasion to make it clear that the operation undertaken to kill Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad was one-of-a-kind and not the norm, given the risks involved and the negative repercussions it had for US-Pakistan relations.

#### Sea basing solves deterrence – Allows for rapid forward deployment and global deterrence

Michael **Perry, 2009**, U.S. navy commander, “ Importance of Seabasing to Land Power Generation”, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508337&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Seabasing supports numerous aspects of America’s National Security, Defense and Military Strategies. This is best summarized by President George W. Bush recently declaring that the U.S. is “developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating platforms close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight.”36 In particular, U.S. National Defense Strategy relies upon the “ability to rapidly deploy and redeploy forces” as the “keystone” of U.S. National Military Strategy.37 Seabasing facilitates rapidly assembling and projecting the forces required to address any traditional, irregular, catastrophic and/or disruptive challenge and denies the sanctuary needed to plan attacks against the U.S. and develop weapons of mass destruction.38 This directly addresses national objectives regarding “strategic access” to “retain freedom of action,” “strengthening alliances and partnerships” and establishing “favorable security conditions.”39 Thus, Seabasing reassures our allies, helps deter and defeat potential adversaries, maximizes use of the “global commons” of the high seas, and ensures “timely generation and deployment of military forces” throughout the world.40 This approach to force design and planning “focuses less on a specific adversary” and more on flexibly responding to how an “adversary might fight” at a nearly unlimited number of locations.41 Thus, the extremely flexible capabilities of Seabasing 11 are ideally aligned with the extremely flexible requirements of the National Security, Defense and Military Strategies of the United States.

### rels

#### There is no correlation between democracy and peace.

**Rosato ’3** – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (Sebastian, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review, November 2003, <http://rrii.150m.com/t08/Sebastian%20Rosato%20-%20The%20Flawed%20Logic%20of%20Democratic%20Peace%20Theory.pdf>)//SS

The causal logics that underpin democratic peace the- ¶ ory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace ¶ with one another because the mechanisms that make up ¶ these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's ¶ proponents. In the case of the normative logic, liberal ¶ democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic ¶ norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one an- ¶ other with trust and respect when their interests clash. ¶ Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, demo- ¶ cratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace- ¶ loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies ¶ are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of sur- ¶ prise attack, and open political competition offers no ¶ guarantee that a democracy will reveal private informa- ¶ tion about its level of resolve. In view of these findings ¶ there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy ¶ causes peace. ¶ Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim ¶ by pointing out that even in the absence of a good ex- ¶ planation for the democratic peace, the fact remains ¶ that democracies have rarely fought one another. In ¶ addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for ¶ the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique ¶ should also offer a positive account of the finding. ¶ One potential explanation is that the democratic ¶ peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American ¶ power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the ¶ democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II ¶ phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. Second, the United States has been the dom- ¶ inant power in both these regions since World War II ¶ and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional ¶ peace. ¶ There are three reasons we should expect democratic ¶ peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post- ¶ 1945 period. First, as even proponents of the demo- ¶ cratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies¶ in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer ¶ that were in a position to fight one another. Since 1945, ¶ however, both the number of democracies in the in- ¶ ternational system and the number that have had an ¶ opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly ¶ (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of dou- ¶ ble democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to ¶ fight one another than members of other types of dyads ¶ prior to World War 11, they have been significantly ¶ more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). ¶ Third, the farther back we go in history the harder it ¶ is to find a consensus among both scholars and poli- ¶ cymakers on what states qualify as democracies. De- ¶ pending on whose criteria we use, there may have been ¶ no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have ¶ been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett ¶ 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly ¶ certain that democracies have hardly fought each other ¶ at all. ¶ Most of the purely democratic dyads since World ¶ War I1 can be found in the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies ¶ directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or sep- ¶ arated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and ¶ 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields ¶ 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1.306 (54%) ¶ were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) ¶ were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) ¶ comprised one American state and one European state. ¶ In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been ¶ confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and ¶ Western Europe. ¶ American preponderance has underpinned, and con- ¶ tinues to underpin stability and peace in both of these ¶ regions. In the Americas the United States has suc- ¶ cessfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving ¶ out the European colonial powers and selectively in- ¶ tervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do ¶ not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or ¶ to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. ¶ The result has been a region in which most states are ¶ prepared to toe the American line and none have pre- ¶ tensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the expe- ¶ rience of both World Wars persuaded American poli- ¶ cymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the con- ¶ tinent ever returning to the security competition that ¶ had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major ini- ¶ tiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic ¶ Treaty, European integration, and the forward deploy- ¶ ment of American troops on German soil should all ¶ be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed ¶ either to protect the European powers from one an- ¶ other or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign ¶ states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity ¶ and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in ¶ European politics. These objectives continue to pro- ¶ vide the basis for Washington's European policy today ¶ and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its ¶ support for the eastward expansion of the European ¶ Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the ¶ most dominant state in both the Americas and Western ¶ Europe since World War II and has been committed,¶ above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace. Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is ¶ caused by democracy or by some other factor such ¶ as American preponderance has implications far be- ¶ yond the academy. If peace and security are indeed a ¶ consequence of shared democracy, then international ¶ democratization should continue to lie at the heart of ¶ American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, ¶ democracy does not cause peace, then American poli- ¶ cymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy ¶ that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make ¶ America more secure.

#### Zero risk of Latin America escalating

**Munks 9** – Americas Analyst, IHS Jane's (Robert, BBC, “Could war erupt in arms-spree LatAm?” 9/15/2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8256686.stm) //RGP

But in practice, the risk of war breaking out is still negligible, given the likelihood of massive dissuasive pressure from both the US and Brazil. For the moment, at least, arms acquisitions by Mr Chavez continue to be a mix of both nationalistic pride and sabre-rattling. Economic suicide Elsewhere on the continent, fears of an arms race between neighbouring Chile and Peru - which have contested a maritime boundary since a war in 1879 - resurface periodically. Yet here again, the actual threat is minimal. Peru knows that it would be economic suicide to try to match Chile's vastly superior armed forces. Sporadic outbursts of nationalist rhetoric are good for letting off steam, but do not indicate genuine military competition. Even military minnows Paraguay and Bolivia have recently been mentioned in an "arms race" context. Recent Bolivian military purchases - including helicopters from Russia - briefly raised over-exaggerated fears in Paraguay of a retaliatory re-run of the bloody 1932-1935 Chaco War, in which Bolivia lost large swathes of territory. In reality, however, the appetite for confrontation is non-existent.

#### Democracy causes proliferation

**Ostrawski ‘2,** (James, a trial and appellate lawyer, libertarian and political author, Rutgers and Stanford, “The Myth of Democratic Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace in the 21st Century,” Lewell Rock, http://www.lewrockwell.com/ostrowski/ostrowski72.html)

Arguably, the greatest threat to world peace is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war increases with the number of states which have them. The risk of accidental explosion increases with the number of such weapons as does the risk of terrorists securing such weapons. Democracies have led the way in inventing, producing, and exploding nuclear weapons. Currently, of the eight states that have them, only two are dictatorships. See, Figure No. 7. The first nuclear power, the United States, developed them at the same time it was becoming the world’s most powerful state. Therefore, the nuclear bomb soon became the symbol of global political power. Other states rushed to develop them. Perhaps they would have done so anyway, but the fact that the United States, the world’s most prestigious state, had done so, made such pursuit irresistible. We are told that the United States developed these weapons to stop Hitler. However, production was rushed even after Hitler was defeated, "to defeat Japan." After Japan was defeated, nuclear weapons production continued at a vigorous pace. Of course, about one minute after World War II ended, we were told that we needed them to defend against our ally, the Soviet Union. The truth is, democratic states produce nuclear weapons, not to defend against a specific enemy, but to advance their power, which is after all the coin of the political realm. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by mostly democratic states means that democracy has failed to provide a solution to the greatest danger of our times. Rather, democracies are a major part of the problem.

#### Global nuclear war

**Taylor ‘1** (Theodore, Chairman of NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer, Recipient of the US Atomic Energy Commission’s 1965 Lawrence Memorial Award and former Deputy Dir. of Defense Nuclear Agency, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in “Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking”, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

#### Alt causes – rule of law, judicial reforms, flow of money

**Miller and DeLeon 9** - \*Stephanie, consultant on U.S.-Latin America relations and was formerly the Research Associate for the Americas Project on the National Security Team. Born in Venezuela with family from Colombia, Miller earned her degree from Duke University in International Comparative Studies with a focus on Latin America. She currently lives in Bogotá, Colombia, \*\*Rudy, Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at American Progress

(“Transcending the Rio Grande,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf)//BB

The U.S.-Mexico relationship is ready for renewed collaboration on a range of issues that ¶ bind the United States and Mexico together. The global economic crisis and increasing ¶ violence along the U.S.-Mexico border have raised the relationship to the forefront of ¶ U.S. national and economic security concerns. Indeed, within 60 days in office President ¶ Obama laid out a new border security strategy intended to target the ways in which the ¶ United States contributes to the violence raging just south of its border. This is a good first ¶ step, but more needs to be done and the United States needs to think about its relationship with Mexico beyond the Rio Grande.¶ The policy recommendations included in this report provide the Obama administration ¶ with a blueprint for ways to expand and strengthen U.S.-Mexico relations beyond the issue ¶ areas that have traditionally defined the relationship, as well as reinvigorate the issue areas ¶ that have historically dominated bilateral relations. This report focused on concrete policy ¶ recommendations in four areas: ¶ • Improving the rule of law and judicial reform in Mexico.¶ • Stopping the illegal flow of weapons and money from the United States to Mexico.¶ • Exploring enhanced cooperation in economic development.¶ • Promoting alternative energy cooperation and investment.¶ By tackling these issues head on and in a sustained manner, the Obama administration ¶ can begin to build on the important first steps taken on March 24 to begin to repair and ¶ strengthen relations with one of the United States’ most important and strategic allies in ¶ the hemisphere.

#### Democracy promotion fails

**Carothers 7** (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, oversees the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Program, and Carnegie Europe)

(Thomas, “US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush,” Foreign Affairs, Sept 2007, [http://www.carnegieendowment. org/publications/index.cfm?fa= view&id=19549](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19549))

U.S. democracy promotion must be recalibrated to account for larger changes in the international context. A host of ongoing developments, such as the rise of authoritarian capitalism, new trends in globalization, and the high price of oil and gas, **have eroded the validity of a whole set of assumptions on which U.S. democracy promotion was built** in the 1980s and 1990s. The next administration will need to respond in large and small ways, such as by drawing an explicit tie between energy policy and democracy policy, re-engaging internationally at the level of basic political ideas, reducing the America-centrism of U.S. democracy building efforts, and strengthening the core institutional sources of democracy assistance.

#### Util justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

**Weizman 11** (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

**We have to evaluate their epistemology first and their epistemology is flawed by imperialism – cross apply Morrisey and Veltmeyer**

### terror

#### Terrorism is low probability and low impact – can be contained and prevented

**Gross and Gilles 4/23** – director of Internet Communications for Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, and director of Sol Kula Healing (April 23 2012, Matthey Barrett and Mel, “How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-perils-of-apocalyptic-thinking/255758/>, mrs)

Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse. Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language, from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties?¶ Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming.¶ Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype.¶ This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?¶ In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are **extraordinarily** rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### Can’t solve – US Counter-terror strategy is fundamentally flawed and counter productive

**Huffington Post 8** – (“Rand Corp – War on Terror is a Failiure”, 7/31/08, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/rand-corp----war-on-terro\_b\_116107.html) //RGP

The Rand Corporation, a conservative think-tank originally started by the U.S. Air Force, has produced a new report entitled, "How Terrorist Groups End - Lessons for Countering al Qaida." This study is important, for it reaches conclusions which may be surprising to the Bush Administration and to both presidential candidates. To wit, the study concludes that the "war on terrorism" has been a failure, and that the efforts against terrorism should not be characterized as a "war" at all. Rather, Rand suggests that the U.S. efforts at battling terrorism be considered, "counterterrorism" instead.¶ And, why is this so? Because, Rand concludes, after studying 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006, that military operations against such groups are among the least effective means of success, achieving the desired effect in only 7% of the cases. As Rand explains, "[a]gainst most terrorist groups . . . military force is usually too blunt an instrument." Moreover, "[t]he use of substantial U.S. military power against terror groups also runs a significant risk of turning the local population against the government by killing civilians."¶ In terms of this latter observation, there is no better case-in-point right now than Afghanistan - the war that both candidates for President seem to embrace as a "the right war" contrary to all evidence. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military forces should properly be known as, "The Wedding Crashers," with the U.S. successfully bombing its fourth (4th) wedding party just this month, killing 47 civilians. According to the UN, 700 civilians have died in the Afghan conflict just this year. Human Rights Watch reports that 1,633 Afghan civilians were killed in 2007 and 929 in 2006. And, those killed in U.S. bomb attacks are accounting for a greater and greater proportion of the civilian deaths as that war goes on. As the Rand Corporation predicts in such circumstances, this has only led to an increase in popular support for those resisting the U.S. military onslaught. In short, the war is counterproductive.¶ Consequently, as the Rand study reports, the U.S. "war on terrorism" has been a failure in combating al Qaida, and indeed, that "[a]l Qaida's resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. counterterrorism strategy." In the end, Rand concludes that the U.S. should rely much more on local military forces to police their own countries, and that this "means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all." If the politicians take this study seriously, and they should, they should abandon current plans for an increase in U.S. troop involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, the U.S. military should be pulled out of Afghanistan altogether, just as it should be pulled out of Iraq.¶ Interestingly, the current study from Rand, a group not considered to be very dovish, mirrors its much earlier study which also declared that the U.S.'s "war on drugs" - that is, the effort to eradicate drugs at the source (e.g., cocaine in Colombia and heroin in Afghanistan) thorugh military operations -- is a failure. Instead, Rand opined, the U.S. would do better to concentrate its resources at home on drug addiction treatment - a measure the Rand Corporation concluded is 20 times more effective than the "war on drugs." Sadly, the U.S. did not pay attention to that study then, and it remains to be seen whether it will pay attention to Rand's current study.¶ Again, (and if you read my posts you will see me quote this passage often) Senator Obama was correct, both as a matter of morality as well as practicality, in calling for an "end [to] the mindset which leads us to war." This is so because war has profoundly failed us. Unfortunately however, the United States, and those running for its highest office, appear unable to escape from this mindset.¶ Instead, they continue to search for military options for problems which have no military solutions. In the process, U.S. soldiers die and thousands upon thousands of civilians are killed abroad. Meanwhile, the stated objective of the U.S., whether it be fighting drugs or fighting terror, is only further undermined. One look no further than Al Qaida itself -- which evolved from the U.S.'s military support for the Afghan mujahideen in pursuit of its "war on communism" -- as proof of this fact.¶ In short, we continue to create and re-create our own enemies through our addiction to war and force. It is indeed high time to "end the mindset which leads us to war." However, we as citizens in this ostensible democracy will have to work hard to push our leaders toward this end, for they appear unwilling and/or unable to even begin the process of moving toward such an objective.

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#### Manufacturing is at 6 month high

**Jamrisko 9/18** – Bloomberg News Economy Reporter and White House Assistant Correspondent (Michelle, Design to Part News, “U.S. Manufacturing Hits Six Month High,” 9/18/2013, <http://news.d2p.com/2013/09/18/u-s-manufacturing-hits-six-month-high/>) //RGP

Industrial production rose in August by the most in six months, indicating U.S. manufacturing will contribute more to the expansion.¶ Output at factories, mines and utilities climbed 0.4 percent after no change the prior month, a report from the Federal Reserve showed today in Washington. The median forecast in a Bloomberg survey of 85 economists called for a 0.5 percent advance in August. Manufacturing, which makes up 75 percent of total production, advanced by the most this year.¶ The strongest vehicle sales in almost six years are propelling factory activity, encouraging companies such as Ford Motor Co. to boost plant capacity. A pickup in global markets and stronger consumer demand would help spark further progress in the sector that struggled earlier this year.¶ “A lot of it’s driven by auto sales,” Gus Faucher, senior economist at PNC Financial Services Group Inc. in Pittsburgh, said before the report. “Manufacturing is roughly keeping pace with the economy. Now that Europe’s coming out of recession, that’s going to support manufacturing growth toward the end of this year and in 2014.”¶ Manufacturing in the New York region expanded less than forecast in September even as orders and sales grew at a faster pace, separate data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York showed. The bank’s general economic index eased to 6.3 from 8.2 last month. Readings greater than zero signal expansion in New York, northern New Jersey and southern Connecticut. A gauge of the six-month outlook advanced to the highest level since April 2012.¶ Stock Futures¶ Stock-index futures maintained gains after the figures. The contract on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index expiring in December rose 1 percent to 1,699 at 9:24 a.m. in New York.¶ Estimates for industrial production in the Bloomberg survey ranged from a drop of 0.1 percent to an increase of 0.7 percent.¶ Manufacturing, which accounts for about 12 percent of the economy, climbed 0.7 percent after falling a revised 0.4 percent. July factory output was previously reported as a 0.1 percent drop.¶ Today’s Fed report also showed that capacity utilization, which measures the amount of plants that are in use, increased to 77.8 percent from 77.6 percent the prior month.¶ Utility output decreased 1.5 percent, the fifth straight drop. Mining production, which includes oil drilling, increased 0.3 percent.¶ Auto Production¶ The output of motor vehicles and parts jumped 5.2 percent after a 4.5 percent decrease a month earlier, today’s report showed. Industrial production excluding autos and parts increased 0.2 percent for a second month.¶ The automobile industry is bolstering an improved outlook for production in the world’s largest economy. Cars and light trucks sold at a 16 million annualized rate last month, the fastest since November 2007, after 15.7 million in July, figures from Ward’s Automotive Group showed. Sales at General Motors Co., Ford Motor Co., Toyota Motor Corp. and Honda Motor Co. exceeded analysts’ estimates.¶ Dearborn, Michigan-based Ford Motor Co., the second-largest U.S. automaker, is expanding output of its Fusion sedan, and said its factory in Flat Rock, Michigan, could produce another model as demand grows. The additional shift of 1,400 new workers at the plant will boost Fusion capacity more than 30 percent.¶ “We expect the sales momentum to stay here in the U.S. and around the world,” Joe Hinrichs, Ford’s president of the Americas, told reporters on Aug. 29.¶ Machinery Production¶ Details of the industrial production data released today also showed machinery production rose 0.8 percent, erasing the decline from a month earlier. Output of construction materials rose 0.3 percent. Output of computers and electronics increased 1.6 percent.¶ Consumer goods production advanced 0.3 percent, while output of business equipment rose 0.9 percent.¶ Texas Instruments Inc., the largest analog-chip maker, is among companies with a brighter outlook as global markets stabilize.¶ “Orders continue to be quite solid” this quarter, Chief Financial Officer Kevin March said at a Sept. 11 technology conference. “We continue to build backlog, which is a good sign. We continue to see strength in three of the four regions of the world,” with Asia, Japan, and the Americas expanding, he said.¶ The U.S. economy is projected to grow at a 2 percent annualized pace in the third quarter after expanding at a 2.5 percent rate in the prior three months, according to the median estimate of economists surveyed by Bloomberg from Sept. 6 to Sept. 11. A previous survey conducted Aug. 2 to Aug. 6 showed an estimate of 2.3 percent for the third quarter.

#### Deterrence breaks down- leader failure, crisis time, war planning, and fog of war

**Cimbala 08** (Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia Author: Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State, [Comparative Strategy](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713769613), Volume [27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713769613~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D27#v27), Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg791929845) March 2008 , pages 113 - 132 Abstract Pismarov)

The figures show that even assured destruction forces or purely existential deterrent forces have some problems of crisis instability, especially under unfavorable conditions of alertness and launch doctrines. Forces that require flexible targeting or other capabilities beyond assured destruction will feel pressured to ignore the danger of crisis instability and increase their reliance on generated alert and prompt launch. Reliance on hair triggered forces can create its own dependency that skews war plans and decision makers' expectations about the failure of deterrence. This dependency illustrates one possibly perverse way in which the characteristics of forces deployed interact with vertical proliferation (the sizes of forces) and horizontal proliferation (the numbers of nuclear states) to create crisis time friction and the “fog of war” to the detriment of stable deterrence. Conclusions   From the standpoint of military strategy, anticipatory attacks may be a necessary evil. They cannot be excluded from the tool kits of policymakers and military planners. On the other hand, preemption and preventive options must be used with care. Even when they are employed with favorable military results, anticipatory attacks can have undesirable political side effects. And the history of warfare suggests that anticipatory attacks can invite all of the “fog of war” and “friction” that Clausewitz warned about. Nuclear anticipatory attacks raise issues in addition to conventional ones. Although the Cold War witnessed no nuclear anticipatory attacks, it was marked by several nuclear crises in which the latent or manifest threat of anticipatory nuclear strikes was present. Deterrence based on preemptive threat of nuclear attack is less fault tolerant than deterrence based on the threat of conventional preemption. Although the psychology of deterrence may seem the same in both cases, the consequences of misjudgment are potentially much more catastrophic for a mistaken nuclear preemption. In addition, shorter timelines and greater confusion on the part of national leaders are almost inevitable for nuclear, compared to conventional, first strikes.

#### Overconfidence in deterrence will cause nuclear war

**Glaser and Fetter ‘5** (International Security 30.2 (2005) 84-126 Counterforce Revisited Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions [Charles L. Glaser](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v030/30.2glaser.html#top) is Professor and Deputy Dean of the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. [Steve Fetter](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v030/30.2glaser.html#top) is Professor and Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Pismarov)

Although U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would provide these foreign policy benefits, they would also bring significant risks. Most basic, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy interests more assertively could increase the probability that an adversary will use nuclear weapons against it. By promising to reduce U.S. vulnerability, counternuclear threats could make the United States willing to engage in certain conflicts that it would otherwise avoid and to bargain harder in others. Although the balance of resolve would shift toward the United States, there could be cases in which the probability that an adversary will escalate to nuclear attack also increases. This can occur when the shift in the balance of resolve increases uncertainty about which state’s resolve is greater.54 The somewhat counterintuitive result is that while enhanced counternuclear capabilities strengthen the willingness of the United States to pursue its interests, they can also increase the probability that the United States or its allies will suffer a nuclear attack. In cases in which this is not true, U.S. counternuclear capabilities either are insufficient to restore leeway to the United States’ foreign policy or unnecessary because it already enjoys a large advantage in resolve. In addition, there is some danger that the United States will exaggerate the effectiveness of its counternuclear capabilities and, as a result, run an unjustifiably high risk of suffering a nuclear attack. As stressed earlier, for counternuclear attacks to be effective, the United States would require excellent intelligence on the location and operation of the adversary’s nuclear force. U.S. leaders who fail to appreciate uncertainties in U.S. intelligence might launch a nuclear attack that was much less likely to be effective than they believed. It is essential that U.S. leaders be fully informed about the likely effectiveness of U.S. counternuclear capabilities, including not only uncertainty about U.S. weapons systems, but also uncertainty about U.S. intelligence concerning the adversary’s force deployments and operations. Any biases in the U.S. system that exaggerate the overall effectiveness of U.S. damage-limitation capabilities could lead to unwarranted assertiveness and the accompanying risks of nuclear attack.

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#### And, the CP boosts flexibility and reduces response times

Michael **Perry, 2009, U**.S. navy commander, “ Importance of Seabasing to Land Power Generation”, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508337&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

The rise of the Soviet Navy during the Cold War presented a new peer competitor and slowed development of sea based support of land power generation. However, the fall of the Soviet Union has renewed interest in “Seabasing.” 3 Once again, the U.S. lacks a peer competitor on the high seas and must reconsider its relevance to national security. The primary difference is that Huntington’s advice has become even more relevant and important. In particular, Seabasing supports the National Security Strategies of the U.S. with mobile operational and logistics platforms that help offset the dramatic decline in U.S. access to overseas bases. These national security strategies require rapid access to potential Joint Operating Areas and deployment of follow-on forces as necessary to deter potential aggressors and execute and reinforce U.S. Foreign Policy. In response, Sebasing allows the U.S. Navy to project military power on short notice anywhere in the globe either unilaterally or in support of Joint and combined operations. This eliminates the need to support marginally democratic regimes for fear of losing access to overseas bases or forcibly seize or establish marginally useful expeditionary air and sea ports. Rather, Joint Force Commanders can apply force directly to an objective at the time and place of their choosing from the relative safety of the high seas As a result, Seabasing has become a Joint Integrating Concept of great importance to all aspects of the U.S. Department of Defense. Specifically, Sebasing forms one of the “Pillars” of the “Sea Power 21” strategy to evolve the U.S. Navy from a “blue-water, war-at-sea” force to a “global joint operations” force, which is capable of confronting “regional and transnational dangers” on land as well as sea.4 Similarly, Seabasing is essential to transforming the U.S. Army and Air Force to a more responsive and truly joint force. Yet, over 50 years after Huntington first described its importance, the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense are still struggling to clearly define the goals and objectives of Seabasing and overcome the “mythology and misunderstanding” that has “stifled” its development.5

#### Counter-terror avoids politics

**USA Today 13** – (“Obama outlines counterterrorism policy,” 5/23/2013, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/23/obama-counter-terrorism-speech-drones-guantanamo-bay/2354001/>) //RGP

Congressional Republicans challenged Obama's analysis of the struggle against al- Qaeda.¶ "We are still in a long, drawn-out conflict with al-Qaeda," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who lost the 2008 presidential election to Obama. "To somehow argue that al-Qaeda is quote 'on the run' comes from a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible."¶ McCain also said that he and others would work with Obama to find "common ground" for "both our counterterrorism objectives and our highest values as a nation of laws."

#### Strong lobbies support defense-spending

**US State News**, 9-13-**09**, “MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, NOT MILITARY SPENDING, MUST BE AT HEART OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SPEAKERS TELL DPI/NGO CONFERENCE ROUND TABLE”. Lexis.

During the ensuing question-and-answer period, one participant asked if the United States was ready to reduce military spending as a precondition for increased security, peace and development, as called for in Article 26 of the United Nations Charter. Another expressed concern over militarism in Chile, which had experienced its own "9/11" in 1973, when a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet ousted the President. Several non-governmental organization representatives said they were moved by Ms. Anaya's statement, and supported her call for justice for impoverished, disadvantaged people who had fallen into a life of crime and violence. One asked about the process of forgiveness, and its link to global security. Several participants asked how quality education could be achieved in Mexico and elsewhere. In response, Ms. Berrigan said it was in fact possible for the United States to reduce its military budget. In April, there had been some rearranging at the United States Pentagon, which was looking at weapons systems that were no longer relevant to national security and military concerns. A proposal to cut military expenditures by 25 per cent had been made, but there was disagreement over where to cut spending. Cutting spending required political will and not bowing to pressure from the strong lobby in Washington, D.C., of weapons manufacturers. The United States and other countries had much to learn from countries like Costa Rica that did not have a military budget, but had achieved national security.

#### **Counterplan solves terrorism – 2 reasons**

#### **1) Its key to counter-terrorism – current budget cuts to counter-terrorism guarantee that the CP is the only way to solve because even if the plan gives back resources it won’t have the money to use those**

#### Budget cuts risk lack of terror readiness

**AFP 13** [Agence France Presse, Global Post, 3/19/13, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130319/fbi-says-budget-cuts-threaten-counterterrorism-ops]

FBI director Robert Mueller warned Tuesday that the sharp budget cuts affecting all US agencies, including the federal police force, threaten crucial counter-terrorist operations. The FBI boss, speaking before a House of Representatives committee, said that the $550 million in cuts over the next seven months until the end of the fiscal year will mean, among other things, leaving 2,200 vacant positions unfilled.

#### **2) No retaliation means terrorism wont escalate – their Ayson ev says the reason that terrorism would cause extinction is because the US will respond with nukes – the CP fiats that won’t happen**

#### Prefer our evidence --- there are institutional and professional reasons to inflate the risk of terrorism

**Mueller, 04** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

In addition, it should be pointed out that the response to September 11 has created a vast and often well-funded terrorism industry. Its members would be nearly out of business if terrorism were to be back-burnered, and accordingly they have every competitive incentive (and they are nothing if not competitive) to conclude that it is their civic duty to keep the pot boiling. Moreover, there is more reputational danger in underplaying risks than in exaggerating them. People routinely ridicule futurist H.G. Wells’ prediction that the conflict beginning in 1914 would be “the war that will end war,” but not his equally confident declaration at the end of World War II that “the end of everything we call life is close at hand.” Disproved doomsayers can always claim that caution induced by their warnings prevented the predicted calamity from occurring. (Call this the Y2K effect.) Disproved Pollyannas have no such convenient refuge.

#### Even if they could get them they can’t use them

**Zenko and Cohen 12**, \*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world. Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### No retaliation - no targets and too hard to trace

**Dowle, 05** (Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

Because terrorists tend to be stateless and well hidden, immediate retaliation in kind is almost impossible. But some nuclear explosions do leave an isotopic signature, a DNA-like fingerprint that allows forensic physicists such as Naval Postgraduate School weapons systems analyst Bob Harney to possibly determine the origin of the fissile material in the bomb. Nuclear forensics is not a precise science, Harney warns. Post-attack sites are almost certain to be contaminated with unrelated or naturally occurring radioactivity, and there are numerous, highly enriched uranium stashes in the world with unknown signatures. But there is no question, according to Peter Huessy, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and consultant to the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., that Russian forensic experts could quickly detect Russian isotopes, and that highly enriched uranium (HEU) from, say, France could readily be differentiated from American HEU. But, Huessy warns, distinguishing post-blast residues of Pakistani uranium from North Korean uranium would be more challenging, probably impossible. Because neither country is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA inspectors have been unable to collect from their facilities reliable isotope samples that could be compared to post-attack residues. Even if the uranium were traced, the source nation could claim that the material had been stolen.

#### Manufacturing at an all time high—decreased Chinese production and Europe factory boom

**Reuters 8/1**-(nqa, “Europe's factories grow, U.S. manufacturing at two-year high” pg online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-global-economy-idUSBRE97009E20130801//sd)

U.S. manufacturing grew in July at its fastest pace in two years while European factories snapped a two-year run of declining output, suggesting a prolonged euro zone recession may be near its end. Output at British factories also surged last month, according to business surveys released on Thursday, while an index of China's massive manufacturing sector suggested the slowdown in the world's No. 2 economy may be stabilizing. The data should hearten policymakers around the world, particularly those at the European Central Bank who have come under pressure to support an economy struggling to escape from the longest recession in the 17-country euro zone's history. It probably does not, however, point to an imminent tightening of monetary policy. ECB President Mario Draghi on Thursday stressed that interest rates would remain at current lows or lower for an "extended time. On Wednesday, the U.S. Federal Reserve said that the world's biggest economy was recovering but still needed support, dashing some expectations that it would start winding down its own stimulus program as soon as September. "The general tilt of the Fed and othr global central banks is still very accommodative, so I'm not concerned that this data will change that," said Thomas Simons, money market economist at Jefferies & Co in New York, who said the Fed will probably wait until the fourth quarter to slow its monthly bond purchases. A sharp rise in new orders helped propel the Institute for Supply Management's index of national factory activity to a two-year high of 55.4 in July, beating economists' expectations of 52.0 and June's reading of 50.9. A separate index from financial data firm Markit rose to 53.7, a four-month high, from 51.9 in June. "It's obviously good news. Orders have bounced back. If this is happening in the context of a global improvement, that's a good thing," said Pierre Ellis, senior global economist at Decision Economics Inc in New York. Markit's Eurozone manufacturing PMI showed marginal growth among factories for the first time in two years, with the index at 50.3, up from 48.8 in June. Output rose in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland, France and Austria. The company's flash composite PMI, based on surveys of thousands of companies across the region, jumped to an 18-month high of 50.4, from 48.7. Readings above 50 signify growth. Markit chief economist Chris Williamson said it suggested the euro zone would grow by 0.1 percent in the current quarter, in line with a Reuters poll taken earlier this month. In China, the official factory PMI was a bit stronger than expected last month, although growth remained modest. A rival report from HSBC painted a darker picture, showing factory activity at its lowest level in nearly a year. PMI reports showed output and new orders falling in July in India, South Korea and Taiwan. In Indonesia, output and new orders were holding at similar levels to June. Overall, the data allayed fears that the global economy's mid-year lull would deepen, although much still hinges on how many jobs the U.S. economy added in July. That data is due Friday, and economists polled by Reuters expect a 184,000 gain in payrolls compared to 195,000 in June. "We're seeing different trends in different parts of the world, which are to a large extent offsetting each other," said Andrew Kenningham, senior global economist at Capital Economics in London. The biggest surprise came form the UK, where Markit's UK manufacturing PMI jumped to 54.6, trumping even the most optimistic forecast in a Reuters poll of economists and triggering a rise in sterling. Brian Hilliard, economist at Societe Generale, noted the fastest rises in new orders and output since February 2011. "Just amazing. What's the need for (Mark) Carney to do anything?" he said, referring to the new Bank of England Governor. "It's shaping up for Q3 to be stronger than Q2."

#### Deterrence will fail

**Clark 97** (Mark T., director of the national security studies program at California State University. “Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age-book reviews: Neorealism versus Organizational Theory,” <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n1_v41/ai_19238111> Pismarov)

Sagan's critique is a healthy antidote to Waltz's optimism. In his view, there are two principal arguments that suggest pessimism about any future with a greater number of nuclear-armed adversaries. From his study of militaries, Sagan finds that their organizational behavior inclines them towards deterrence failure. It is not that militaries want war but that, of all groups in a society, they are the most likely to believe war is probable and are most inclined to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies. Military officers are more skeptical of nonmilitary solutions to conflicts than are their civilian counterparts, according to Sagan. It also makes sense, in classical military terms, to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies, since no military prefers to fight on its adversary's terms. Taking the offensive alleviates some of these problems. Secondly, Sagan argues that newly armed nuclear states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. Here, Sagan's critique is very strong. By examining the history of the U.S. nuclear safety record he is able to document many near accidents and bureaucratic snafus that could have led to catastrophic accidents, and in this way he points out the weakness in Waltz's arguments. Sagan comments:Waltz asked why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than did the old ones? The evidence of the number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War suggests that there would be reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new nuclear states even if their safety difficulties were "only" as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers (p. 80).He adds six reasons why new nuclear powers are unlikely to compile the safety record of the United States. But if the problem is acute for newly emergent nuclear powers that develop their programs indigenously, it will be doubly so for those that inherit or buy their programs. They will lack even the discipline that a new nuclear nation will accrue by investing enormous amounts of time, talent, and treasure into developing its nuclear program.

#### Fear in a crisis causes accidental and unauthorized launch

**Gerson 9** (CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE RETHINKING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE MODERATOR: JAMES ACTON, ASSOCIATE, NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SPEAKERS: MICHAEL S. GERSON, RESEARCH ANALYST, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES JEFFREY G. LEWIS, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 1776 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, D.C. Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.)

So from the perspective of crisis instability, retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first—even if ambiguous, essentially the all-options-on-the-table approach—is essentially dangerous because it generates fear of a U.S. disarming first strike in an intense crisis and thereby increases the chances that nuclear weapons are used accidentally, inadvertently, or deliberately. There are essentially three pathways – I think there’s probably more, but I would argue that there are essentially three pathways in which you may get nuclear use through crisis instability; in other words, adversaries’ fear of a U.S. disarming first strike. First, the fear of a U.S. first strike could prompt an opponent to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, disperse its forces rapidly and haphazardly, raise alert levels, and perhaps even pre-delegate launch authority to ensure launch even if commanding control apparatus is severed. This rapid dispersion in the heat of an intense crisis increases the chances that – of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. And so the fear of a U.S. first strike in an intense crisis generates all of these incentives to disperse forces to make them more survivable, to ensure some sort of retaliation, and that increases the chances that they in fact may be used accidentally or in an unauthorized way.

#### Democracy doesn’t prevent war

**Taner 02,** – Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Research Associate at Syracuse University’s global Affairs Institute; Editorial Assistant, International studies Review – (Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, “The Myth of Democratic Peace Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of The ‘Democratic Peace Theory’,” Turkish School of international Relations, Vol. 1.3, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number3/binnurozkececi.htm)

The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the "democratic peace" theory is the essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The 'democratic peace' theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of other domestic factors such as political culture,(35) degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations,(36) the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies,(37) strategic culture(38) among others in decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the "democratic peace theory" lacks sensitivity to context and decision-making process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in decision-making unaccounted for. Consequently, although "democratic peace" theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the importance of "democracy" in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that "democratic peace" is theoretically and empirically overdetermined

#### Democracies go to war – Israel and India both prove

**Shaw, 00** (Martin, Professor of International Relations and Politics, University of Sussex, 2000, “Democracy and peace in the global revolution,” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/democracy.htm, Hensel)

In the global era, established liberal-democratic states do not fight each other. But once again, it obvious that this is not simply because they are democracies, but because they are embedded in the raft of common Western and global state institutions. Indeed it is not just liberal democracies which do not fight each other: the major non-Western states (Russia, China, India, Brazil, etc.), whether democratic or not, are not likely to fight with the dominant Western powers. Outside the Western core of global state power, however, national centres are more weakly integrated with its institutional structures, and regional institutions which might inhibit local conflicts are much weaker than they are in the core. In the Cold War era, interstate rivalries between major regional powers - such as between Russia and China, India and Pakistan and China, Indonesia and Malaysia, Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Arab states - led to wars and border incidents. While the integrative tendencies in the emerging global polity, including the democratisation trends, may increasingly inhibit wars, it clearly remains possible that such interstate rivalries will generate new wars. It is clear that democratisation in itself is not a guarantee of war-avoidance in such conficts. Israel, the only internally democratic state in the Middle East, has also been the most belligerent; Indian democracy has been quite compatible with bellicosity towards Pakistan. Democratic as well as military governments may see war, so long as it can be kept limited and relatively cost-free, as a means of boosting popularity. Thus Yeltsin’s Russia sought a military solution in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, despite the lessons of the late-Soviet failure in Afghanistan. Only in defeat did Russia’s weak democracy penalise the regime for the new disaster, and then not decisively.

#### Empirics prove

**Hartzell 2k** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

#### Sub-regional organizations check

**Isacson, 12** - senior associate for regional security at the Washington Office on Latin America (Adam, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS” World Politics Review, 5/22, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas>)

The regional conflict-resolution trends are clear. Interstate conflicts remain far easier to resolve than internal conflicts, although the task of resolving them is now falling less to the OAS and more to new subregional organizations or ad hoc diplomatic arrangements. U.S. support, once seen as indispensable for the success of any conflict-resolution effort, is now optional: Twenty years after Esquipulas II, the region resolved the Colombia-Venezuela, Colombia-Ecuador and Zelaya disputes on its own, with no input from Washington.

#### No Latin American conflict impact

**Ghitis, 12** - an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracy-lab)

Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political battles. The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative maneuvers, even thinly disguised coups, punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent, but eventually die off. ¶ Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within the elusive parameters of democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum. It has meant that even when the system disappoints, there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct. ¶ To be sure, violence is far from defeated. Central American countries have some of the highest murder rates in the world as a result of drug trafficking. Mexico has seen some 50,000 die in the battle to defeat the narco-gangs. The decades-old insurgency in Colombia is not finished, and street protests occasionally turn deadly throughout the region. ¶ But it's a long way from the civil wars and the "dirty wars" that characterized the region in the second half of the 20th century. Then, the routine means of deciding the shape of the political and economic system was by taking up arms and killing those on the other side of the ideological divide. No more.

# 1nr

#### Growth prevents conflict escalation – solves the entirety of the case impacts

**Griswold 7**

Daniel, Trade Policy Studies @ Cato, 4/20/’7, Trade, Democracy and Peace, http://www.freetrade.org/node/681

A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

#### CIR solves US Mexico relations- economic partnership

Marczak 4/18/13 (Jason, director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas and senior editor of Americas Quarterly, Immigration reform gets U.S. in on Mexico's boom, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/opinion/marczak-immigration-the-new-mexico>)

 Comprehensive immigration reform will open a gateway to one of Latin America's fastest-growing economies. By providing a pathway to citizenship for the undocumented immigrants of Mexican origin, reform will make it easier for laborers to cross borders, which will harness the competitiveness of both countries. It would also show that the U.S. is a true economic partner with Mexico and the rest of the Americas. Legal status would open the door for these immigrants and their children to further increase their contributions to the U.S. economy and to start small businesses that would capitalize on their cross-border networks. This is a highly likely scenario as immigrants are more likely to start a business than those born in the U.S., and Mexicans represent the greatest number of foreign-born small-business owners.

#### Will pass – time and will

**Foley 10/17**

Elise, Huffington Post, Obama To House On Immigration: If You Have Ideas, 'Let's Hear Them', 10/17/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/17/obama-house-immigration\_n\_4115818.html

President Barack Obama vowed Thursday to restart his push for comprehensive immigration reform this year after a bruising fight on government spending that only increased bad blood between the two parties.¶ "The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do, and it's sitting there waiting for the House to pass it," he said during remarks from the White House. "Now if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let's hear them. Let's start the negotiations. But let's not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years."¶ "This can and should get done by the end of this year," he added.¶ Obama and immigration reform advocates have insisted there's still time and the will to pass reform, even though House Republicans are showing little interest in doing so. After the Senate passed a comprehensive immigration bill in June, reform stalled in the house when House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) vowed not to pick it up, regardless of likely support from most Democrats and some Republicans. Instead, the House GOP vowed to pass piecemeal measures -- with no talk of a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants -- that have now faded from attention.

#### Will pass – top priority – only bipartisan issue

**Zaimov 10/17**

Stoyan, Christian Post, Obama, Evangelicals to Make Immigration Top National Priority Following Fiscal Crisis Resolution, 10/17/13, http://www.christianpost.com/news/obama-evangelicals-to-make-immigration-top-national-priority-following-fiscal-crisis-resolution-106850/

President Barack Obama and evangelical leaders have pledged to make the issue of immigration reform the top national priority following months of delays due to the Syria crisis and government shutdown.¶ "President Obama is not alone in making immigration reform a top priority. Across the country, local and regional conservative leaders continue to showcase their considerable support for members of Congress who back commonsense and bipartisan reform," Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum, said in a statement.¶ Obama pledged on Tuesday in an interview with Univision that "the day after" the fiscal crisis has been resolved, he will push for a vote on immigration reform. On Wednesday, political leaders finally reached an agreement on a temporary government funding bill and a temporary extension of the nation's debt limit, which will at least delay further decisions on the topic until the beginning of 2014.¶ Obama's re-election bid in 2012 was strongly backed by Hispanics, Reuters reminded readers, partly beause the president has promised reforms addressing the concerns of the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country.¶ The Senate and House of Representatives have not yet found common ground on passing comprehensive immigration reform, however, something which Obama blamed House Speaker John Boehner for.¶ "We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate. The only thing right now that's holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives," Obama said on Tuesday.¶ Evangelical groups across America have continued pushing for such reform, however, framing it not only as a political discussion, but a theological one as well.¶ "As evangelicals, we don't believe there are second class images of God, and therefore we don't believe in a second class status for people who are willing to follow and earned path for citizenship," said the Rev. Jim Wallis, president and CEO of Sojourners, which is part of the Evangelical Immigration Table¶ The EIT has suggested that undocumented immigrations should be allowed to work toward citizenship as long as they embrace all the responsibilities that come with it, and be willing to undergo a three to five year waiting period.¶ Noorani added in NIF's statement that there have been over 400 "Pray4Reform" gatherings in 40 states this past week where evangelical leaders and their congregations have expressed their moral urgency for immigration reform.¶ "On October 29, Republicans in the House of Representatives will feel that support in person when Illinois sheriffs, Texas preachers, South Carolina farmers and Indiana business owners come to Washington for the Americans for Reform Day of Action. These leaders will echo what's been heard on Main Street over the last 18 months – those who hold a Bible, wear a badge or own a business are ready for reform," Noorani continued.¶ "Immigration reform is the only truly bipartisan issue that the House of Representatives has on its docket – it's a priority for an overwhelming majority of conservative faith leaders, law enforcement officers and business owners. It must become the top priority for the House of Representatives as soon as possible."

#### Will pass – new momentum

**Matthews 10/17**

Laura, International Business Times, Immigration Reform 2013: ‘Finish The Job,’ Obama Tells Congress, 10/17/13, http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-2013-finish-job-obama-tells-congress-1430650

In addition to pursing a balanced budget and finding consensus on a farm bill, Obama urged Congress to finish the work started on comprehensive immigration reform. The momentum pro-reform advocates saw earlier this year died off with the fiscal fight that ended Wednesday night, but now the president thinks it can come back. ¶ “We should finish the job of fixing our broken immigration system,” Obama said at a White House conference on Thursday. “There is already a broad coalition across America that’s behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform.” The Senate passed its 2013 comprehensive immigration reform bill in June, which included an increase in border security and a 13-year path to citizenship for immigrants in the country without legal papers. However, House Republicans have said they will not act on that measure unless it is supported by a majority of their caucus.¶ “The majority of Americans thinks this is the right thing to do,” Obama said. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear ‘em. Let’s start the negotiations.”¶ Obama encouraged lawmakers to not put off the problem for another year or longer.¶ “This can and should get done by the end of this year,” he said.¶ In response to the president's call for action on immigration reform, American’s Voice, a pro-reform group, said the principal question remains whether House Speaker John Boehner will act.¶ The group’s Executive Director, Frank Sharry, called Obama’s offer a “get-out-of-jail card” being offered to Boehner and “smart” House Republicans.¶ “Working with Democrats to pass reform will help the GOP rehabilitate their badly damaged brand, solve a huge political problem facing the GOP with respect to Latino, Asian and immigrant voters, and prove to the American people they can govern responsibly rather than recklessly,” Sharry said in a statement. “The window of opportunity is open now. The goal should be to move through the House in a way that leads to bicameral negotiations with the Senate this year and a bill to the President’s desk as soon as possible.”

#### 2 - Piecemeal reform kills CIR – delay and tougher negotiations

**McAuliff 4-25**-13

Washington correspondent for the New York Daily News and current reporter for the Huffington Post, internally quoting McCain and Schumer

Michael McAuliff House Unveils Immigration Reform Piecemeal Plan; Senators Warn It Is 'Not Going To Work' http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/immigration-reform-house\_n\_3155908.html

"It has got to be a comprehensive approach," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), noting that past attempts to pass popular measures to legalize the children of undocumented immigrants had all failed when lawmakers began to tack on amendments. "We can't do individual bills because the problem is people say, 'What about me?'" declared Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), speaking at a breakfast with reporters. "What we found is, ironically, it may be a little counterintuitive, but the best way to pass immigration legislation is actually a comprehensive bill because that can achieve more balance, and everybody can get much, but not all, of what they want. "I think that the idea of doing separate bills is just not going to work," Schumer added. "It's not worked in the past, and it's not going to work in the future." In particular, the senators argued that if immigration reform does not include a pathway to citizenship for people who are already in the United States, it will fail. "There's no way of getting this job done without giving people a path to citizenship," said McCain. "Any attempt to say in the House that you will not have a path to citizenship would be a non-starter, and I say that unequivocally," said Schumer. "It will not pass the Senate. I do not think you would get a Democratic vote." Some observers have also warned that a go-slow approach will make passage more difficult because it risks pushing the debate into the 2014 election year, when lawmakers will be more sensitive to pressure from interest groups.

#### 3 - CIR is a delicate compromise between business and labor – the plan independently tanks reform and saps PC

**Werner 3-30**-13

Congressional reporter for AP specializing in immigration

“Immigration Reform: Business, Labor Get Deal On Worker Program, Source Says” By ERICA WERNER 03/30/13 08:41 PM ET EDT http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/30/immigration-reform\_n\_2985521.html

Big business and labor have struck a deal on a new low-skilled worker program, removing the biggest hurdle to completion of sweeping immigration legislation allowing 11 million illegal immigrants eventual U.S. citizenship, labor and Senate officials said Saturday. The agreement was reached in a phone call late Friday night with AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka, U.S. Chamber of Commerce head Tom Donohue, and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, who's been mediating the dispute. The deal resolves disagreements over wages for the new workers and which industries would be included. Those disputes had led talks to break down a week ago, throwing into doubt whether Schumer and seven other senators crafting a comprehensive bipartisan immigration bill would be able to complete their work as planned. The deal must still be signed off on by the other senators working with Schumer, including Republicans John McCain of Arizona and Marco Rubio of Florida, but that's expected to happen, according to a person with knowledge of the talks who spoke on condition of anonymity. With the agreement in place, the senators are expected to unveil their legislation the week of April 8. Their measure would secure the border, crack down on employers, improve legal immigration and create a 13-year pathway to citizenship for the millions of illegal immigrants already here. It's a major second-term priority of President Barack Obama's and would usher in the most dramatic changes to the nation's faltering immigration system in more than two decades. "The strength of the consensus across America for just reform has afforded us the momentum needed to forge an agreement in principle to develop a new type of employer visa system," Trumka said in a statement late Saturday. "We expect that this new program, which benefits not just business, but everyone, will promote long overdue reforms by raising the bar for existing programs." Schumer said: "This issue has always been the dealbreaker on immigration reform, but not this time." The AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce, longtime antagonists over temporary worker programs, had been fighting over wages for tens of thousands of low-skilled workers who would be brought in under the new program to fill jobs in construction, hotels and resorts, nursing homes and restaurants, and other industries. Under the agreement, a new "W" visa program would go into effect beginning April 1, 2015, according to an AFL-CIO fact sheet. In year one of the program, 20,000 workers would be allowed in; in year two, 35,000; in year three, 55,000; and in year four, 75,000. Ultimately the program would be capped at 200,000 workers a year, but the number of visas would fluctuate, depending on unemployment rates, job openings, employer demand and data collected by a new federal bureau pushed by the labor movement as an objective monitor of the market. One-third of all visas in any year would go to businesses with under 25 workers. A "safety valve" would allow employers to exceed the cap if they can show need and pay premium wages, but any additional workers brought in would be subtracted from the following year's cap. The workers could move from employer to employer and would be able to petition for permanent residency after a year, and ultimately seek U.S. citizenship. Neither is possible for temporary workers now. The new program would fill needs employers say they have that are not currently met by U.S. immigration programs. Most industries don't have a good way to hire a steady supply of foreign workers because there's one temporary visa program for low-wage nonagricultural workers but it's capped at 66,000 visas per year and is only supposed to be used for seasonal or temporary jobs. Business has sought temporary worker programs in a quest for a cheaper workforce, but labor has opposed the programs because of concerns over working conditions and the effect on jobs and wages for U.S. workers. The issue helped sink the last major attempt at immigration overhaul in 2007, which the AFL-CIO opposed partly because of temporary worker provisions, and the flare-up earlier this month sparked concerns that the same thing would happen this time around. Agreement between the two traditional foes is one of many indications that immigration reform has its best chance in years in Congress this year. After apparent miscommunications earlier this month between the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce on the wage issue, the deal resolves it in a way both sides are comfortable with, officials said. Workers would earn actual wages paid to American workers or the prevailing wages for the industry they're working in, whichever is higher. The Labor Department would determine prevailing wage based on customary rates in specific localities, so that it would vary from city to city. There also had been disagreement on how to handle the construction industry, which unions argue is different from other industries in the new program because it can be more seasonal in nature and includes a number of higher-skilled trades. The official said the resolution will cap at 15,000 a year the number of visas that can be sought by the construction industry. Schumer called White House chief of staff Denis McDonough on Saturday to inform him of the deal, the person with knowledge of the talks said. The three principals in the talks – Trumka, Donohue and Schumer – agreed they should meet for dinner soon to celebrate, the person said. However, in a sign of the delicate and uncertain negotiations still ahead, Rubio sent a letter Saturday to Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., calling for a deliberate hearing process on the new legislation and cautioning against a "rush to legislate." Rubio and a number of other Republicans are striking a tricky balance as they simultaneously court conservative and Hispanic voters on the immigration issue. Separately, the new immigration bill also is expected to offer many more visas for high-tech workers, new visas for agriculture workers, and provisions allowing some agriculture workers already in the U.S. a speedier path to citizenship than that provided to other illegal immigrants, in an effort to create a stable agricultural workforce.

#### PC key – Obama pushing

**Martosko 10/17**

David, Daily Mail US Political Editor, Immigration battle threatens to dwarf debt-limit fight as many Republicans fear power of 17 MILLION newly legalized loyal Democrats, 10/17/13, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2464112/Immigration-battle-threatens-dwarf-debt-limit-fight-Republicans-fear-power-17-MILLION-newly-legalized-loyal-Democrats.html

The White House has shifted gears and put its policy team in immigration overdrive, zooming past the debt crisis that threatened to sink the republic and on to the task of normalizing the estimated 11 million U.S. residents who have no legal basis for being there.¶ The Democrat-dominated U.S. Senate passed a bill in June that would provide a citizenship path for those who have been in the U.S. since the end of 2011. But as with the early days of the debt crisis and the partial government shutdown, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives aren't eager to consider it.¶ The White House has avoided saying that it take advantage of a weak House and spend its political capital to push an immigration policy, but Republicans have reason to suspect the other shoe is about to drop.

#### PC key

**Dickinson 09** (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholarsoftenarguethata president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often throughquid pro quo exchanges, at critical juncturesduring the lawmaking sequence**.** Spatialmodels of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster **"**pivots" within Congress.This logic findsempirical supportin vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998, 153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.).

#### Spills over and it’s finite

**Marshall and Prins, ‘11** [BRYAN W. MARSHALL Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September) 2011]

We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.

#### PC key – empirics

Dmitri **Simes**, Executive Director, Nixon Center and Paul Saunders, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory,” NATIONAL INTEREST, **2010**, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626>, accessed 10-2-11.

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our ownconversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost five to ten votes. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty. That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

#### More evidence – And it’s reverse causal

**Schier 09** (Steven E., professor of political science at Carleton College, “Understanding the Obama Presidency”, The Forum, Vol. 7, Issue 1, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=forum)

At the center of the conflict lies the desire of presidents to create political “regimes” supported by popular approval and constitutional authority (Schier 2004, 3). A regime is a stable authority structure that reworks Washington power arrangements to facilitate its own dominance. Presidential power is intimately tied to presidential authority, defined as the “expectations that surround the exercise of power at a given moment; the perception of what it is appropriate for a given president to do” (Skowronek 1997, 18). Authority, to Skowronek, rests on the “warrants” drawn from the politics of the moment to justify action and secure the legitimacy of changes. The more stable a president's grant of authority, the easier his exercise of power. If a president claims more authority than he actually possesses, however, he invites challenges from rivals that can reduce his authority and power. Obama, initially at least, has broad grants of power and authority. Yet as his political capital drops, the authority of his office will surely shrink. That has been the case with all recent presidents, and will occur during Obama’s time in the oval office. As adverse events arrive, as they inevitably will, he will find that his warrant of authority will fade first, long before his direct presidential powers face serious challenge.

**Capital theory is true -- it spills over.**

**Marshall and Prins, ‘11** [BRYAN W. MARSHALL Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September) 2011]

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#### Winners-win theory is wrong --- Obama’s first term proves

**Calmes 11/13** (Jackie, International Herald Tribune, “Obama looks to budget talks as an opportunity to take control of agenda; News Analysis,” 11/13/2012, Factiva, CMR)

Whether Mr. Obama succeeds will reveal much about what kind of president he intends to be in his second term. Beyond the specifics of any accord, perhaps the bigger question hanging over the negotiations is whether Mr. Obama will go to his second inaugural in January with an achievement that starts to rewrite the unflattering leadership narrative that, fairly or not, came to define his first term for many people.¶ That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies — in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a **leading scholar of the presidency** at Texas A&M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama’s presidency is titled ‘‘Overreach,’’ said, ‘‘He didn’t understand the limits of what he could do.’’¶‘‘They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we’d build this advancing-tide theory of legislation,’’ Mr. Edwards said. ‘‘And that was **very naïve, very silly**. Well, they’ve learned a lot, I think.’’¶ ‘‘Effective leaders,’’ he added, **‘‘exploit opportunities rather than create them.’’**

#### Winner’s Win not true – specific to Obama

Galston, 10 [William, Senior Fellow for Governance Studies – Brookings Institution, “President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties”, 11-4, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/110 4\_obama\_galston.aspx]

Rather than doing this, President Obama allowed himself to get trapped in legislative minutia, even as the country remained mired in a kind of economic slump that most Americans had never experienced and could not understand. Their reaction combined confusion and fear, which the president did little to allay. Ironically, a man who attained the presidency largely on the strength of his skills as a communicator did not communicate effectively during his first two years. He paid a steep political price for his failure. From the beginning, the administration operated on two fundamental political premises that turned out to be mistaken. The first was that the economic collapse had opened the door to the comprehensive change Obama had promised. As incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel famously put it, “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” In fact, as Emanuel himself came to realize, there was a tension between the steps needed to arrest the economic decline and the measures needed to actualize the president’s vision of fundamental change. The financial bailout and the stimulus package made it harder, not easier, to pass comprehensive health reform. Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and-trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists. The legislative process that produced the health care bill was especially damaging. It lasted much too long and featured side-deals with interest groups and individual senators, made in full public view. Much of the public was dismayed by what it saw. Worse, the seemingly endless health care debate strengthened the view that the president’s agenda was poorly aligned with the economic concerns of the American people. Because the administration never persuaded the public that health reform was vital to our economic future, the entire effort came to be seen as diversionary, even anti-democratic. The health reform bill was surely a moral success; it may turn out to be a policy success; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was—and remains—a political liability. Indeed, most of the Obama agenda turned out to be very unpopular. Of five major policy initiatives undertaken during the first two years, only one—financial regulatory reform—enjoyed majority support. In a September 2010 Gallup survey, 52 percent of the people disapproved of the economic stimulus, 56 percent disapproved of both the auto rescue and the health care bill, and an even larger majority—61 percent—rejected the bailout of financial institutions.[[v]](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/1104_obama_galston.aspx%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn5) Democrats’ hopes that the people would change their minds about the party’s signature issue—universal health insurance—after the bill passed were not fulfilled.  (It remains to be seen whether sentiment will change in coming years as provisions of the bill are phased in—that is, if they survive what will no doubt be stiff challenges in both Congress and the states.)

#### Econ collapse Causes nuclear war

**Harris and Burrows 9** Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

**Prolif causes nuclear war— first strikes, use or lose pressures and brinksmanship**

**Kroenig** 5-26-**12** (Matthew, assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, he served as a strategist on the policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2>)

**The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace** and U.S. national security **including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation**. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclearwar. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in humanextinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but **it would be naïve to think that nuc**lear weapon**s will never be used again**. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. **Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which** they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe **that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first**. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. **In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might** believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. **Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal**, in this case Iran, **might feel** use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, **nuclear war could result due to the** reciprocal fear of surprise **attack**.[54] **If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second**. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD**, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war**. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. **We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuc**lear weapon**s continue to spread, *one* leader *will* choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD**. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. **By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down**. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.